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\RECENT

CASES

FCC Acted "Arbitrarilyand Capriciously" Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
By Bonnie Katubig
In Illinois Public Telecommunications Association. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 123
F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held in a per
curiam decision that the Federal
Communications Commission
("FCC") acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously" in numerous aspects of
its Order pursuant to § 276 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
("Act"), 47 U.S.C. § 276. The court
reviewed 20 consolidated petitions in
this case and held that the FCC acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously" by: (1)
mandating both the interim and
permanent compensation rates "for
access code and subscriber 800
calls;" (2) requiring only large
interexchange carriers ("IXCs") to
pay pay-phone service providers
("PSPs") for such calls in the first
interim-plan year; (3) failing to
provide any compensation for
"0+"calls; and (4) adopting a marketbased value for pay-phone assets of
Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs").
TechnologicalAdvances Impede
Adequate Compensationfor PayPhoneService Providers
Through § 276 of the Act,
Congress sought to "promote
competition among pay-phone service
providers." Technological advances
forced PSPs to compete against local
exchange carriers ("LEC") for payphone compensation. However, PSP
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compensation generally fell well
below a fair rate. For example, PSPs
provided three types of services, yet
they were compensated only for two
services, often at depressed rates.
First, PSPs received compensation
for their local call services through
the direct deposit of coins into payphones. Second, unless it was
affiliated with a BOC, the PSP also
received compensation through direct
contacts with IXCs, which allowed
for the PSP's provision of operator
services for collect calls and calls
billed to calling cards or third parties
(collectively, "0+ calls"). Under such
contracts, the IXC becomes the
default provider for 0+ calls in
exchange for a percentage of its
revenues from that PSP's pay-phones.
However, PSPs operated at a competitive disadvantage with the LECs,
who also received subsidies from the
IXCs for originating and terminating
the long-distance calls. Finally, PSPs
received zero compensation for their
provision of access code calls, those
calls allowing the caller to choose the
long-distance carrier, or for subscriber 800 calls. PSPs once were
able to mitigate this problem by
blocking such calls, but the Telephone Consumer Services ImprovementAct, 47 U.S.C.§ 226(c)(1)(B)
(1990), disallowed this practice. At
that time, the FCC had ordered IXCs
to compensate PSPs for access code
calls, yet declined to require compensation for 800 calls. This action
forced PSPs to provide 800 call
service without compensation.

Measures Taken to Avoid Unfair
Competition
Recognizing the unfair compensation plans for PSPs, Congress
enacted § 276 of the Act, which
mandated that the FCC establish a
plan which would ensure that all
PSPs receive fair compensation for
each call made from their payphones. Additionally, the Act forbade
BOCs from subsidizing their payphone service using their telephone
exchange service or access operations
and from discriminating in favor of
their particular pay-phone service.
The FCC also halted intrastate and
interstate carrier access charge payphone service elements, payments,
and subsidies from basic exchange
and exchange-access revenues.
Finally, the FCC mandated a set of
nonstructural safeguards for BOCs.
The FCC determined that the Act
required it to alter the compensation
plans only for those calls for which
PSPs currently did not receive fair
compensation. These were local coin
calls, access code calls, subscriber
800 and other toll-free calls, and 0+
calls made in affiliation with BOCs.
The FCC determined that the
competitive market price for each call
was the best marker for fair compensation to the PSPs. With this
objective in mind, the FCC set rules
for each type of call listed.
For local coin calls, the FCC
required deregulation unless the state
could prove that competition would
not constrain prices. Believing that
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"costs of ... various types of payphone calls are similar," the FCC
applied a "market-based" pricing
system for these calls; this system
sets the price for a local coin call
from a particular pay-phone once the
rates are deregulated. However, the
FCC sets this rate to serve only as the
default rate from which PSPs and
IXCs can begin negotiating.
Next, the FCC dealt with access
codes, subscriber 800, and toll-free
calls, declaring that rather than
having callers deposit coins directly
into pay-phones for such calls, IXCs
should bear the initial calling costs
and later bill the caller or the
subscriber. The FCC also allowed
IXCs wishing to avoid these costs to
block such calls from their phones.
Because the FCC found it technically
feasible, IXCs were given the
responsibility of tracking the number
of these types of calls from each payphone in order to determine the exact
amount owed to each individual PSP.
For those PSPs not affiliated with an
LEC, the FCC devised a two-year
interim compensation plan for access
code, subscriber 800, and toll-free
calls. During the first year of this
plan, IXCs with annual toll revenues
totaling over $100 million would
have to make monthly pro rata
contributions based upon their share
of total long distance toll revenues to
PSPs. The FCC determined the total
amount to be paid into the fund by
multiplying the average number of
such calls made from pay-phones
each month by $.35--the price of a
local call in the majority of deregulated states. In the second year, all
IXCs must pay PSPs either a
negotiated rate or the set default rate
of $.35 per call for these types of
calls.
The FCC next dealt with 0+ calls
made under BOCs. BOCs were
required to make available to all
PSPs any of the basic services that
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BOCs provided to their own payphone affiliate. However, the FCC
allowed BOCs to discriminate
against PSPs for untariffed services
such as installation or maintenance.
Finally, the FCC had to ensure that
LECs could not subsidize their payphone operations with revenues from
other telephone services since this
maintains the LECs' competitive
advantage over PSPs even with the
above provisions. The FCC therefore
regarded all LEC pay-phones as
"unregulated, untariffed customer
premises equipment," which forced
LECs to transfer their pay-phone
assets accounts.

carriers, instead of callers, to pay
PSPs for access code and subscriber
code calls. Fifth, together with a
group of IXCs, PCIA further challenged the FCC decision that carriers
track these calls. Sixth, the BOCs
collectively argued against the FCC's
requirement to transfer the valuation
of pay-phone assets. Seventh, the
BOCs contended that the FCC
arbitrarily and capriciously excluded
inmate and other 0+ calls from the
interim compensation plan. The court
handled each contention in turn,
granting in part and denying in part
the petitions for review.

Petitioners Challenge the FCC's
Requirements Under the Act

Federal Decisions Provide Proper
Textual Analysis for Determining
Jurisdiction Over Intrastate Rates

Pursuant to the FCC mandates,
various petitions for review came
before the court. First, state regulatory commissions and the National
Association of the State Utility
Consumer Advocates ("NASUCA")
challenged the FCC's authority to
regulate local coin call rates. Second,
the IXCs contended that the FCC
acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it: (1) applied the marketbased rate for the interim compensation for access code and subscriber
code calls; (2) excluded IXCs with
toll revenues totaling under $100
million from compensating PSPs for
the first interim period; and (3)
established a local coin call rate as
the default rate for permanent
compensation for access code or
subscriber calls.
Third, two IXCs joined to argue
that the FCC did not provide
adequate notice of the adopted
market-based interim compensation
plan. Fourth, the Personal Communications Industry Association
("PCIA"), members of the paging
industry, alleged that the FCC
arbitrarily and capriciously required

The court relied heavily on the
language of § 276 of the Act and on
federal case law to provide the proper
basis for its decision. First, the court
considered the NASUCA's contention that the FCC lacked the power
under the Act to regulate local coin
calls. The court in LouisianaPublic
Service Commission. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 476
U.S. 355 (1986), held that proper
preemption analysis questions
whether Congress intended the
federal regulation to trump state law.
The court noted that under § 152(b)
of the Communications Act of 1934,
the FCC was not given jurisdiction
with respect to "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations" except where the
language of the Act is "so unambiguous or straightforward so as to
override... § 152(b)." This rule
applied to the language of § 276,
which is an amendment of the Act of
1934 as well, and therefore is subject
to the same limitations.
The court in the present case
concluded that the Act expressly
granted the FCC the power to
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regulate local coin calls. The Act
required the FCC to provide "fair
compensation" to PSPs for all calls;
however, PSPs were not receiving
adequate compensation for local coin
calls. NASUCA argued that "fair
compensation" did not mean that the
FCC had the power to determine
rates and charges. The court disagreed, however, holding that because
PSPs only receive the coins from
these calls, the FCC could properly
regulate the rates of such calls to
ensure fair competition. NASUCA
further argued that even if the FCC
did have the power to regulate local
coin call rates, it made its decision to
deregulate these rates arbitrarily and
capriciously by not considering the
possibility of "locational monopolies." The court dismissed this claim,
reasoning that the FCC reserved the
right to modify the deregulation plans
if such problems made it necessary.
The court also rejected
NASUCAs argument that the FCC
lacked the power to preempt existing
state regulation of these calls,
opining that the language of the
amendment gave the FCC the express
authority to mandate these calls.
Lastly, NASUCA argued that the
FCC could regulate local coin calls
only if the three requirements of 47
U.S.C.§ 160 were met, which
declares that enforcement of the Act
is not necessary to ensure "just and
reasonable" charges or "for the
protection of consumers," and that
forbearance is "consistent with the
public interest." Still, the court
agreed with the FCC that these
requirements fail to apply in the case
at bar because the FCC acted in
direct accordance with the amended
statute. Thus, the court dismissed
each of these arguments as well.
Criticismsof FCC's Compensation
Rate
The court first departed from the
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FCC's Order by criticizing the FCC
decision to set the access code and
800 calls at the same compensation
rate as the local coin calls. According
to the court, the FCC erroneously
concluded that the costs for access
and 800 calls mirrored the costs of
local calls "because the cost of
originating the various types of payphone calls are similar." The court
pointed to evidence provided by IXCs
that conclusively showed that local
coin call costs incorporate origination and termination costs, whereas
access code and 800 calls only
include origination costs. The FCC
countered that, even if access code
and 800 calls warrant higher compensation, this rate acts as the default
rate, and the FCC left IXCs with the
ability to block such calls. Although
the court agreed with both of the
FCC contentions, it still held that the
FCC could not force IXCs to abide
by an erroneously set default rate or
to resort to blocking such calls from
their service. Accordingly, the court
remanded this issue for further
consideration.
FCC Established Interim Plan
Under the FCC's interim plan,
compensation rates were set for
access code and 800 calls, 0+ calls,
and inmate calls for a two-year
period. While IXCs challenged the
rates set for access and 800 calls,
BOCs contested the compensation
plans for the 0+ calls and inmate
calls.
The FCC required that IXCs with
assets over $100 million bear the
total compensation for PSPs based
on a flat rate for the first year. The
IXCs first questioned the FCCmandated flat rate, which was based
on $.35 per access and 800 calls. The
court stood by its prior determination
that this rate, which erroneously
equated local coin calls with access
code and 800 calls, was arbitrary and
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capricious. The court held that the
FCC needed to set a new interim rate
for these types of calls. The court
further agreed with the IXCs, stating
that the FCC had not justified its
decision to place full compensation
responsibilities on large IXCs for the
first interim year. Although the FCC
based its decision on administrative
convenience, the court held that this
reason fails to justify a payment
exemption for all but large IXCs.
This issue was remanded for review.
The BOCs then challenged the
interim compensation plans set for
both 0+ calls and inmate calls. Per
the FCC's Order, PSPs receive
payment for access and 800 calls, but
zero compensation for 0+ or inmate
calls. The FCC did not challenge the
merits of the BOCs' complaint of
failing to provide fair compensation
for the 0+ calls. Instead, it relied on
the procedural issue regarding the
BOCs' failure to bring the claim to
the FCC. However, the court found
that the BOCs had set aside this
challenge, provided that the FCC
devise at least some plan of compensation for these calls. Therefore,
when the FCC's interim scheme
omitted such a plan, the BOCs
properly raised this challenge. The
court held that the FCC acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in not
creating a compensation scheme for
these calls when the Act expressly
sought fair payment for all calls.
Furthermore, the BOCs challenged the exclusion of inmate calls
from the interim plans. Since the
FCC stated that the interim plan only
accounted for access code and 800
calls, inmate calls were excluded
from the plan. Again, the court called
into question the FCC's failure to
account for all calls as prescribed by
the Act. Although the FCC requested
that the court defer judgment on this
issue until it could provide alternate
information on inmate calls from a
separate petition, the court held that
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the FCC needed to review its interim
plan to fit the Act's goal of providing
fair compensation for all calls,
including 0+ and inmate calls.
Mandatesof the FCC Order
The FCC Order mandated that
carriers, not callers, pay the initial
compensation for 800 calls. Pursuant
to this goal and with available
technologies in mind, the FCC
further required that IXCs track such
calls to determine their compensation
to each PSP. The PCIA petitioners
first contended that requiring carriers
to pay the 800 costs was arbitrary and
capricious because it did not advance
the legislative goal of promoting
competition. PCIA argued that the
callers used the service provided by
the carriers, yet the FCC still
expected the carriers to bear the costs
of such calls with no option to avoid
the costs. However, the FCC successfully countered that the carriers could
effectively negotiate for lower
compensation amounts by blocking
calls through excessive rates. The
FCC also argued against PCIA's
contention that the caller, not the
carrier, received the primary benefit
of 800 calls. The FCC explained that
the carrier was, in fact, the primary
beneficiary of the call because the
caller relied on a particular carrier no
matter where the call originated.
Moreover, the court supported the
FCC's decision to maintain the
convenience of coinless 800 calling
to the inconvenience to the carrier.
Because the FCC sought to balance
these considerations, the court did
not find the FCC's decision arbitrary
and capricious.
In conjunction with this mandate,
the FCC had given IXCs the responsibility of tracking pay-phone calls so
that each IXC could determine its
compensation rate. The court quickly
dismissed the IXCs' argument that
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this decision was arbitrary and
capricious. As all parties agreed that
this technology remained available to
the IXCs, the Court of Appeals held
that the FCC acted reasonably in
requiring IXCs to track these calls.
Challenge to the FCC Order
The APCC petitioners challenged
the FCC Order allowing BOCs to
only discriminate in basic service
provisions but not in actual communication services. The court applied
the two-part test to review an
agency's construction of a statute
established by the Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). The first part asks
whether Congress has specifically
addressed the precise issue at bar so
that the court may follow the
legislative language. However, where
Congress has left the issue unanswered, the court then must ask
whether the agency proposed a
permissible interpretation of the
statute.
The court further relied upon
Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Skinner, 894 F.2d 1362 (D.C.Cir.
1990), ruling that the court must
consider not only the language of the
statutory provision, but also the
structure and context of the total
statute to properly determine whether
Congress had specifically addressed
the issue. Pursuant to this case law,
the court held that § 276(b)(1)(C)
seemed ambiguous when considering
the statute as a whole, but it still
ruled the APCC interpretation
impermissible. The court opined that
the Act sought to reduce regulation to
promote competition. It agreed with
the FCC that although it was
necessary to ensure nondiscrimination for services which BOCs could
withhold, discrimination for basic
services provided by other entities

was unnecessary. The court collectively denied these challenges.
The BOC and APCC Petitioners
joined to challenge the FCC decision
that LECs providing pay-phone
services could either transfer their
pay-phone operations to structurally
separate affiliates or operating
divisions with no common use of
assets. However, the FCC required
the LECs to record the transfer of
assets at the higher of fair market
value or net book value. The FCC
reasoned that the higher valuation
would note appreciations in values of
the transferred assets, helping to
ensure that gains benefit rate-payers
and shareholders. The court agreed
with the rule stated in Board of
Public Utility Commissionersv. New
York Telephone. Co., 271 U.S. 23
(1926) that utility service rate-payers
pay for their service so that they "do
not acquire any interest... [in] the
company. Property paid for out of
moneys received for service belongs
to the company." But the court also
cited the rule in Democratic Cent.
Committee of the Districtof Columbia v. WashingtonMetropolitanArea
TransitCommission., 485 F.2d 786
(D.C. Cir. 1973), that rate- payers
and shareholders are not necessarily
the beneficiaries of increases in the
company's value.
The court at bar thus applied the
two-part test established by the court
in AT & T Information Systems, Inc.
v. FederalCommunicationsCommission, 854 F.2d 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The court first asked which party
bore the risk of loss of the assets.
Where this determination proved
difficult, the second step of the test
dictated that those who then bear the
financial burden of the particular
activity should receive the benefits.
While the court noted that ratepayers bore this risk in the past, it
determined that recent changes in the
regulations transferred this risk to the
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investors. Following this trend, the
court found that the investors bore
the risk of loss, thus negating the
need to proceed to the second step of
the Democratictest.
Therefore, the court rejected the
APCC's challenge to the book
valuation method for the same reason
it accepted the BOCs' challenge to
the FCC's fair market method: the
shareholder bore the risk of loss so
the shareholder should reap the
benefits. Finally, the court rejected
the APCC argument that the FCC
required a transfer of pay-phone

assets from regulated to unregulated
books, stating that the Order instead
only required that pay-phone assets
not be accounted in separate affiliates.
In sum, the court sought to
preserve the legislative intent of the
Act while abiding by the express
language of § 276. It interpreted the
legislative intent to be the promotion
of fair competition within the area of
pay-phone service while it adhered to
the language of providing PSPs with
fair compensation for each call they
serviced. In accordance with these
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goals, the court remanded the issues
of: (1) the interim and permanent
rates for access code and 800 calls;
(2) requiring only large IXCs to pay
full compensation in the first interim
year; (3) failing to provide interim
compensation for 0+ and inmate
calls; and (4) assigning fair market
value for pay-phone assets transferred from BOCs to separate
affiliates.

Credit Reporting Agencies Have a Duty to Go Beyond
Original Sources When Reinvestigating
Credit Report Inaccuracies
By Andrew Geier
In Cushmanv. Trans Union
Corp., 115 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1997),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's judgment that, as a matter of law, Trans
Union Corporation ('TUC") met its
obligations under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA") when it
relied solely on the creditors' original
information in determining the
accuracy of a consumer's credit
information. The court held that the
FCRA requires a credit reporting
agency to go beyond its original
sources of credit information when
reinvestigating inaccuracies in a
credit report after the consumer
informs the agency of those inaccuracies.
Credit CardsFalsely Obtained
Jennifer Cushman ("Cushman")
was a college student in Vermont in
the summer of 1993 when an
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unknown person applied for and
obtained credit cards in her name
from American Express ("Amex"),
Citibank Visa ("Citibank"), and
Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase").
This person obtained the credit cards
by providing the credit grantors with
Cushman's name, address, social
security number, and other identifying information. Cushman was
unaware of the existence of these
cards until the following year when a
bill collector informed her that TUC
had published a credit report showing
that she was delinquent in her
payments on the cards. By that time,
the unknown person had accumulated
charges of approximately $2,400
between the three cards.
Cushman informed TUC that she
had neither applied for, nor used, the
cards and suggested that someone
had fraudulently obtained them. TUC
responded by contacting Amex and
Chase to determine whether
Cushman's verifying information

(such as her name and social security
number) in TUC's report matched the
information that they had. Amex and
Chase confirmed that their information was the same. Additionally, TUC
discovered that Cushman had not
opened a fraud investigation with the
credit grantors. Since she had not
begun a fraud investigation and the
verifying information matched, TUC
left the information on Cushman's
credit report. However, since TUC
was unable to contact Citibank, it
deleted the Citibank delinquencies
from the report.
TUC sent Cushman an updated
copy of the report containing the
Amex and Chase delinquencies.
Upon receiving the report, Cushman
wrote a letter to TUC contesting the
delinquencies still contained in the
report and offered to sign affidavits
explaining that these delinquencies
were not hers. In response to the
letter, TUC performed a reinvestigation that was identical to its first
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